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COMMENT
ACCOUNTANTS, INCOME TAX AND THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
By Jms K. SMmIT
IS A TAX problem legal or accounting in nature? Unimportant as the
answer may be to the taxpayer, it may have vital significance to the
problem solver. Much of an accountant's work involves tax problems.
Must he call in a lawyer to answer every legal question that he en-
counters? The answer to this question is obviously no. Some legal
competency is required for most tax questions-the ability to read the
directions in filling out forms for example. For such tasks, no one would
suggest calling a lawyer. But at the other end of the spectrum are tax
problems which are clearly for the lawyer; M'Culloch v. Maryland1 was
a tax case. How limited an accountant is in his work by the threat of
an unauthorized practice suit, and how limited he should be is the
subject of this comment.
The practice of accounting is regulated in California by the Busi-
ness and Professions Code.2 In addition to the limitations imposed
upon accountants specifically,3 there are some general regulations,
which apply to all businesses and professions. One of these, espe-
cially important to the accountant engaged in income tax practice, is
the restriction of the practice of law to those who are active members
of the state bar.4 Is there some line that can be drawn to separate the
field of income taxation into zones of legal competence and accounting
competence? The courts have attempted to draw such a line in cases
involving alleged unauthorized practice of law by non-lawyers engaged
in tax work.5
117 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
2 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 5000-135.
3 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5100.
4 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6125: "No person shall practice law in this State unless
he is an active member of the State Bar."
5 See Annot., Services in Connection with Tax Matters as Practice of Law, 9
A.L.R.2d 797 (1948).
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The task of delineating the function of the lawyer from that of the
accountant in income tax practice is difficult enough in itself, without
the additional complications inherent in the problem. The courts have
attempted to draw a line between the professions which will separate
lawyers from non-lawyers in general. The cases do not distinguish
among non-lawyers who are certified public accountants, public ac-
countants, 6 and non-lawyers with no accounting competence. This
failure of the courts to discriminate among the various occupational
competencies of the non-lawyer has led the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants into litigation not involving one of its
members, out of fear that an adverse decision would apply to C.P.A.'s
equally with other non-lawyers.
Another inherent difficulty is in the "unauthorized practice" ap-
proach to the problem. Some members of the bar are quite unwilling to
admit that there can be any practice of law by a non-lawyer that is "au-
thorized."7 The "unauthorized practice" approach so links the problem
with ethics of the profession, that to appear conciliatory toward a com-
peting profession is to be in favor of appeasing the unethical.8 This
approach is open to the retaliatory accusation that "ethics" is only
a blind for protecting lawyers from competition. If the dispute between
lawyers and accountants descends to this level, there results what
appears to be a jurisdictional dispute between competing unions.9
As a premise upon which to work, it is assumed that the primary
interest of the bar in preventing unauthorized practice is to protect
the public from the unscrupulous and the incompetent.'" It is also
assumed that the accountants in question are neither unscrupulous
nor incompetent, but are attempting to serve their client in the best
way possible. These premises may not be wholly valid, but since the
6 The distinction between the certified public accountant and the public account-
ant is in the titles and not the services performed. The certificate of C.P.A. requires an
examination whereas the certificate of public accountant does not. 1 CAL. JuR. 2d
Accountants §§ 2, 5 (1952).
7 See, e.g., Otterbourg, A Continuing Professional Problem: Ethics and the Unau-
thorized Practice of the Law, 44 A.B.A.J. 350, 353 (1958).
8 Id. at 350.
9 See Jennings, Common Interests of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants, 36
U. DE;T. L.J. 399 (1959).
10 [T]he Bar originally "arose from a public demand for the exclusion of those
who assumed to practice law without adequate qualifications therefor." . ..
The Bar did not come first; it was unauthorized practice which came first, and
whose deficiencies were so great as to result in a public demand for a legal
profession with special qualifications and restrictions.
Report of Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, 25 U. P. News 199,
206 (1959).
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inquiry here is to determine the proper scope of the accountant's work
in income taxation, they will suffice.
To emphasize the importance to the accountant of drawing the
line between what is permissible, and what is "unauthorized practice,"
it would be well to note summarily the possible consequences of prac-
ticing law without authorization. (1) The unauthorized practice of
law is proscribed by criminal sanction in all states. In California the
Business and Professions Code declares it to be a misdemeanor." (2)
The unauthorized practitioner may be found guilty of contempt of
court;12 however, an accountant guilty of unauthorized practice in tax
matters is not likely to be subject to this sanction. (3) 'While there
appears to be no pertinent California case, an injunction is often used
to prevent the unauthorized practice of law, notwithstanding that eq-
uity does not generally intervene to enforce a criminal statute.13 (4)
In addition to the penal and regulatory powers of the state over the
unauthorized practice of law, the accountant may be hit in the pocket-
book by his client. A contract for services must be set aside if any of
the services rendered were the unauthorized practice of law, because
the courts will not enforce a contract to violate a penal statute.' 4
The problem of determining whether a given activity in the tax
field is to be styled "unauthorized practice" is not new to the courts
or to the organized professional associations of lawyers and account-
ants. The first formal meeting between the American Bar Association
"I Any person advertising himself as practicing or entitled to practice law or
otherwise practicing law, after he has been disbarred or while suspended from
membership in the State Bar, or who is not an active member of the State Bar,
is guilty of a misdemeanor. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6126.
The judicial department of government, and no other, has power to license
persons to practice law. Statutes may aid by providing machinery and criminal
penalties, but may not extend the privilege of practicing law to persons not
admitted to practice by the judicial department.
Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 179, 52 N.E.2d 27, 30 (1943). The position
is amply supported that the ultimate responsibility for regulation of the practice of law
is an inherent power of the judiciary, unless otherwise provided by the state constitution.
Bennett, Non-Lawyers and the Practice of Law Before State and Federal Agencies, 46
A.B.A.J. 705, 706 (1960). See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) where
it was held that the power of a state to prescribe the qualifications for admission to
the bar of its own courts is unaffected by the fourteenth amendment, and the Supreme
Court of the United States cannot inquire into the reasonableness or propriety of the
rules the state may prescribe.
12 6 CAL. JuR. 2d Attorneys At Law § 32 (1952).
'3 Ibid.
14 Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 807, 273 P.2d 619 (App. Dep't Super.
Ct. Los Angeles, 1954), where even though not pleaded as a defense, it was the impera-
tive duty of the court to deny the plaintiff recovery because a contract to violate a penal
statute may not give rise to a cause of action.
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and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants was in
1932, to discuss a proposal that only attorneys be permitted to practice
before the Board of Tax Appeals; the proposal produced no agree-
ment.15 The disputes between the two associations from 1932 unitil
1942 indicated that their differences could be better settled by negotia-
tion than by litigation or legislation. One of the early litigations in
which bar and accountants met head on occurred in 1942.
In Lowell Bar Assn v. Loeb,'6 the Bar Association of Lowell, Mas-
sachusetts, sought to restrain the American Tax Service, headed by
defendant Birdie Loeb, from holding itself out as authorized to practice
law, and from practicing law. The defendant, the wife of a practicing
attorney, had formed the Service in answer to the demand for tax
assistance created by the then recent laws requiring tax returns from
many wage earners not previously covered. The Service had several
branch offices, about one hundred employees-none of whom were law-
yers-and an extensive advertising program. It did not attempt to assist
in filing tax returns for corporations, partnerships, estates, fiduciaries,
or businessmen. The Service was solely for those whose income came
principally from wages, and the return was filed for all at a uniform
price: two dollars for either a state or a federal return, three dollars
and seventy-five cents for both.
In refusing to grant the injunction to the Bar Association, the court
held that the preparation of simple income tax returns was not the
practice of law-a question that seems to have been without doubt in
most circles, as non-lawyers had virtually pre-empted the income tax
field by 1939.17 The court noted the difficulty that courts in general
have had in formulating a definition of the practice of law.18 This court
set forth a definition based upon a division of income tax work into
three broad areas: that clearly within the sole competence of a lawyer;
that clearly within the sole competence of an accountant; and a middle
area or "penumbra," in which the tasks performed may have significant
legal consequences and yet are commonly performed by non-lawyers.
The preparation of income tax returns is not, the court decided, in the
area within the sole competence of a lawyer.19 In other words, the
15 Queenan, An Inquiry into the Relationship of Law and Accounting, 36 U. Drr.
L.J. 422 (1959).
16315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943).
17 Levy, The Scope and Limitations of Accountants" Practice in Federal Income
Taxation, 89 J. AccotnrANcy 470 (1950).
1s "It is not easy to define the practice of law. Since it undertakes to determine
all controversies as to rights that may arise among men .... 315 Mass. at 180, 52
N.E.2d at 31.
19 There are instruments that no one but a well trained lawyer should even
undertake to draw. But there are others, common in the commercial world, and
preparation of tax returns does not lie "wholly within the practice of
law," but any service that does lie "wholly within the practice of law"
can lawfully be performed only by a lawyer. This test for determining
whether the work of an accountant is unauthorized practice is not sat-
isfactory. In fact it seems not to be a test at all, but a restatement of
the conclusion. That is, the preparation of income tax returns is not the
practice of law because it is -not wholly within the practice of law; this
seems to be nothing more than a rephrasing of the conclusion and not
a formulation of the principle from which the conclusion was deduced.
The Loeb decision proved unsatisfactory to accountants. 20 The
American Institute of Accountants 21 was forced to take the side of
defendants whose advertising and other business methods were not
palatable, because the work of accountants in general would be af-
fected by the decision. The holding that simple income tax returns
could be prepared by non-lawyers naturally raised such questions as
whether future decisions would be limited to "simple" returns, and if
so, what was "simple"?22 The "test" set forth did not satisfy the de-
mand for a predictable standard. And finally the litigation gave both
the bar and the A.I.A. some bad publicity. In short, the Loeb case
was a Phyrric victory for the accountants.
In 1944 the A.B.A. and the A.I.A. organized the National Confer-
ence of Lawyers and Accountants to draft a treaty between the pro-
fessions concerning their respective spheres of competence. The result
of the efforts of the Conference was a resolution stating that the public
would be best served if tax returns were prepared by either lawyers
or C.P.A.'s, but that accountants should not prepare legal documents
such as partnership agreements, trust arrangements, and similar tech-
nical papers.23 The resolution ushered in a period of calm that was to
last only until 1947, for it was then that a C.P.A by the name of Bercu
fraught with substantial consequences, that lawyers seldom are employed to
draw, and that in the course of recognized occupations other than the practice
of law are often drawn by laymen for other laymen .... The actual practices
of the community have an important bearing on the scope of the practice of
law... We think that the preparation of the income tax returns in question,
though it had to be done with some consideration of the law, did not lie wholly
within the field of the practice of law.... The final decree should not have
enjoined the respondents from preparing such returns.
315 Mass. at 186, 52 N.E.2d at 34.
20 See Levy, supra note 17, at 473.
2 1 Name changed to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in 1957.
22 See People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 378, 125 N.E. 666,
670 (1919) where the concurring opinion of Pound, J., severely criticized any distinc-
tion based upon whether the papers drawn up were simple or complex.
23 Latham, Report on Relations Between Lawyers and Accountants, 29 CAL. S. BAR
J. 451 (1954).
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was hauled into the courts of New York by the Bar Association of
that state.24
Bercu was charged with the unauthorized practice of law in giving
advice on tax liability to a corporate client for whom he had performed
no other service. He advised the client that a proposed expenditure
was deductible for federal income tax purposes in a certain year. The
advice was in the form of a memorandum based upon one ruling of
the Income Tax Unit of the Treasury Department. The Supreme Court
of Kings County ruled that Bercu had not practiced law; that the
advice given by him was based upon a ruling of a department staffed
principally by accountants, and was nothing more than an indication
of proper accounting practice. 25 In other words, Bercu had advised
his client concerning the accounting practice approved by the Treas-
ury Department rather than the applicable law.
The appellate division did not sustain the reasoning of the lower
court.26 Here it was found that the question posed for Bercu was a
24 In the Matter of New York County Lawyers Ass'n, 273 App. Div. 524, 78
N.Y.S.2d 209, 9 A.L.R.2d 787 (1948), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 728, 87 N.E.2d 451 (1949).
25 The advice which the respondent Bercu gave in this case was based upon a
ruling of the Income Tax Unit of the Treasury Department. This is an admin-
istrative ruling which does not even bind the department, much less the courts.
The department promulgating these rulings is staffed principally by account-
ants. Bercu undoubtedly knew this and treated the ruling as amounting to what
was considered by accountants to be sound accounting practice.
New York County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Bercu, 188 Misc. 406, 420, 69 N.Y.S.2d 730, 742
(Sup. Ct. 1947). The case was described by a certified public accountant as follows:
Specifically, the corporate client, which maintained its books of account on
an accrual basis, had negotiated a settlement with the City of New York
in 1943 whereby the corporation was to pay the city $12,000 in settlement of
New York City Sales taxes incurred in the years 1935, 1936, and 1937, liability
for which had been disputed. There had been no ruling as to the corporation's
liability for the tax until 1943 and the corporation had not billed its customers
for their applicable share of the taxes during the years in question. The ques-
tion which arose, and on which Bercu rendered his advice, was whether the
payment to the city could be deducted for federal income tax purposes in 1943
or whether the payments had to be allocated back to the years 1935, 1936, and
1937. Bercu advised the client that under the tax law the payment was deduct-
ible in 1943. From a technical accounting standpoint under the accrual basis
of accounting, a cost is accrued when incurred, not when paid. A cost is not
incurred, however, until the obligor is legally liable to make payment. Here
the liability was contingent and contested by the corporation until 1943, when
the liability for the tax was finally adjudicated, and hence the tax, although it
might previously have been considered a contingent liability, did not accrue
for accounting purposes until 1943. In this particular the tax practice would
seem to conform to good accounting practice.
Comment, What Is the "Practice of Law"? A Commentary on the Tax Practice Con-
troversy, 36 U. DEr. L.J. 464, 472 (1959).
26 273 App. Div. 524, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209, 9 A.L.R.2d 787 (1948).
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legal question; unfortunately the opinion does not indicate how this
conclusion was reached. But the conclusion that Bercu had passed
upon a legal question did not automatically place him in the category
of the unauthorized practitioner of law. The court said that there are
some legal questions that can be passed upon by an accountant and
some that cannot. The line between the two cannot be readily drawn,
but at least it must be drawn where the accountant passes upon a
legal question apart from his regular accounting work. Thus the court
held that a C.P.A. who advises a client as to the deductibility of an
item for federal income tax purposes, is engaged in the practice of law
if he has performed no other accounting services for the client. This
rather limited holding is not the proposition for which the case is
usually cited.
In addition to the holding of the case, the court went on to com-
ment that if the legal question there passed upon had been incidental
to accounting work, the decision might have been different. This dic-
tum has been referred to as the "incidental test" 27 to determine whether
an accountant has been practicing law. Bercu raised an objection to
the test by pointing out that under it the conduct of two accountants
might be virtually the same, and yet one would be practicing law and
the other not, depending on whether the conduct was incidental to
accounting work. The court recognized the objection but did not find
it controlling.
In answering the contention that its decision would drive account-
ants from the tax field, the court said: 'Vhen... a taxpayer is con-
fronted with a tax question so involved and difficult that it must go
beyond its regular accountant and seek outside tax law advice, the
considerations of convenience and economy in favor of letting its
accountant handle the matter no longer apply, and considerations of
public protection require that such advice be sought from a qualified
lawyer."28 The reference in this concluding part of the opinion to a
question so "involved and difficult" is the germ of a test that another
jurisdiction was to amplify to the exclusion of the "incidental test."
The dictum of Bercu so overshadowed the limited holding that much
of the criticism of the case has been criticism of the dictum only.29
27 The first discovered reference to the "incidental" test is in the concurring opinion
of Judge Pound in People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666
(1919).
28273 App. Div. at 538, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 221, 9 A.L.R.2d at 796 (emphasis added).
29 See Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 807, 273 P.2d 619 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1954); Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N.W.2d 788
(1951); Editorial, What Does the Bercu Decision Mean?, 88 J. AccouNANicy 185
(1949); Comment, Unauthorized Practice of Law-Accountants in the Field of Federal
Taxation, 28 So. CAL. L. REv. 303 (1955).
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The Minnesota court was the first to attack the "incidental test,"
in 1951.30 Conway, a public accountant, had advertised himself as an
"Income Tax Expert." A local unauthorized practice committee sent
out a private detective posing as a prospective client to lay a trap.
The detective spun a story loaded with legal complexities and asked
Conway to handle his tax returns and to help with the associated
problems. Conway complied. The Minnesota Bar Association then
sought an injunction. Although the defendant was not a C.P.A., the
Minnesota Association of Public Accountants, the National Society of
Public Accountants, the Minnesota Society of Certified Public Ac-
countants, and the American Institute of Accountants filed briefs for
him. On the other side appeared the Minnesota and American Bar
Associations.
The questions presented to Conway by the private detective were:
(1) under given facts were he and his wife business partners; (2)
could he claim his wife as an exemption although there had been no
formal marriage; and three other more elementary questions about
income tax filing. The court found that at least in answering question
number one, Conway was practicing law. The determination of the
character of Conway's conduct was based upon yet another test.
The Minnesota court denounced the "incidental test," and offered
its own test, placing more emphasis on the nature of the question posed
to the accountant than the manner in which the question was an-
swered. But before the Conway test can be administered there must
be a preliminary determination whether the question presented was
legal or non-legal. The court did not indicate the test for resolving the
preliminary question, but assumed that a legal question was presented
to a non-lawyer. The following test was then invoked to determine
whether giving advice on a legal question is the practice of law.
Generally speaking, whenever, as incidental to another transaction or
calling, a layman, as part of his regular course of conduct, resolves
legal questions for another-at the latter's request and for a consid-
eration-by giving him advice or by taking action for and in his
behalf, he is practicing law if difficult and doubtful legal questions
are involved which to safeguard the public, reasonably demand the
application of a trained legal mind. What is a difficult or doubtful
question of law is not to be measured by the comprehension of a
trained legal mind, but by the understanding thereof which is pos-
sessed by a reasonably intelligent layman who is reasonably familiar
with similar transactions. A criterion which designates the determi-
nation of a difficult or complex question of law as law practice, and
the application of an elementary or simple legal principle as not, may
30 Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N.W.2d 788 (1951).
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indeed be criticized for uncertainty if a rule of thumb is sought which
can be applied with mechanical precision to all cases. Any rule of
law which purports to reflect the needs of the public welfare in a
changing society, by reason of its essential and inherent flexibility,
will, however, be as variable in operation as the particular facts to
which it is applied.3'
This test presents three essential elements in determining whether
conduct is the practice of law: (1) a legal question-the method of
distinguishing between legal and non-legal is not given-(2) that is
difficult and doubtful, and (3) which must reasonably demand the
application of a trained legal mind. It may well be that element (3)
should be listed as (2) (a), for it may serve better as explaining what
is difficult and doubtful than as adding an independent element. The
existence of the elements of the Conway test will be determined by
one who is a lawyer-a fact that the accountant-non-lawyers are not
likely to overlook.
It was in 1951 that the National Conference of Lawyers and Ac-
countants published the Statement of Principles Applicable to Legal
and Accounting Practice in the Field of Taxation.32 The Statement
set forth general guide lines defining the areas of competency of both
professions, recognizing the three broad areas in tax practice: exclu-
sively accounting, exclusively legal, and a twilight zone between. It
was recommended that in the middle ground the professions maintain
mutual respect and resolve questionable distinctions in favor of the
client. The Conference also recommended that the professional asso-
ciations of the individual states establish joint practice committees of
lawyers and C.P.A.'s to deal with controversies between the professions
without resort to litigation. The court decisions determining the divid-
ing line between the professions were viewed as not helpful to the
spirit of cooperation. The Statement of Principles has been adopted
by the professional associations of several states, but California is not
among the group.83 The California contribution to the resolution of
lawyer-accountant friction came in the form of yet another case.
Both the California State Bar and the California Society of Certi-
fied Public Accountants were attracted to the case of Agran v. Sha-
piro 4 in 1954. Here the accountant, Agran, had persuaded the Inter-
nal Revenue Service that Mr. and Mrs. Shapiro owed the Treasury
Department 200 dollars instead of the over 6,000 dollars claimed. The
3lId. at 481, 48 N.W.2d at 796-97 (emphasis added).
32National Conference Adopts Code for Practice in Income Tax Field, 37 A.B.A.J.
517 (1951).
3 3 Latham, supra note 23.
34 127 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 807, 273 P.2d 619 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles,
1954).
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tax liability of the Shapiros depended upon whether a carry back which
Agran, as the Shapiros' tax accountant, had claimed for a previous year
was a "net operating loss" within the meaning of the Internal Revenue
Code. To convince the agents, Agran spent five days in the county law
library reading over one hundred cases to support his argument. The
Shapiros settled with the Internal Revenue Service for 200 dollars after
informing Agran that his services were no longer needed. Agran sent
a bill for 2,000 dollars; the Shapiros refused to pay. The decision was
that Agran's contract with the Shapiros was not enforceable because
it called for the performance of services constituting the unauthorized
practice of law.
The court held that whether the loss was incurred was a question
of fact, but insofar as the determination involved an interpretation of
a statute, there was an issue of law. The question to be decided was
whether, under admitted facts, the loss was one which could be "car-
ried back." The answer depended on whether the loss was "attrib-
utable to the operation of a trade or business regularly carried on by
the taxpayer" within the meaning of that phrase in the Internal Rev-
enue Code. The court could "see no escape from the conclusion that
under the circumstances this question was purely one of law." 35
The determination that Agran had dealt with a question of law
seems to have been based upon the method in which the question was
answered; unless the problem facing the accountant can be solved
solely by the use of accounting principles and procedures, he is prac-
ticing law if he continues. The court also noted that the particular
question presented to Agran was a difficult and doubtful question of
law, but whereas the Conway test contains the two elements of (1) a
question of law that is (2) difficult and doubtful, the California court
seemed to rely wholly on element (1), adding element (2) merely for
good measure. Although the court quoted at length from the Conway
denunciation of the "incidental test" of Bercu, there is no indication
that it adopted the Minnesota test.36 There is no reason to believe that
the result would have been different if the question posed to Agran
had been clear and unambiguous. It appears from Agran that in Cali-
fornia "unauthorized practice of law" means that only lawyers can
handle questions of law, as opposed to questions of fact. The fine line
that this case presents was well illustrated in a later California decision.
In Zelkin v. Caruso Discount Corp.3 7 the accountant, a law school
graduate but not a member of the bar, had resolved a deduction with
3 Id. at 814, 273 P.2d at 623.
36 See Comment, 28 So. CAL. L. REv. 303, 306 (1955), where the writer concludes
that the Conway test was adopted by the California court.
37 186 Cal. App. 2d 802, 9 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1961).
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the Internal Revenue Service, as did Agran. The Treasury Department
in conducting an audit of Caruso Discount Corporation had proposed
large deficiency assessments on monies held by Commercial Credit
Corporation as reserves on conditional sales contracts sold to Commer-
cial by Caruso. The question was what percentage could Commercial
legitimately hold as a reserve, for the excess would have been taxable
income available to Caruso on demand. In determining the percentage
permissible for Commercial to retain, Zelkin did research at two law
libraries and "reviewed" the original reserve agreement between Ca-
ruso and Commercial. The defendant sought to avoid his contract with
Zelkin for services rendered by relying on Agran, and contending that
Zelkin had practiced law and could not enforce the contract for the
crime.
The trial court awarded a judgment to Zelkin. Throughout the trial
Zelkin argued, in true lawyer-like fashion, that his research in the law
libraries was directed toward the accounting methods that the cases
had approved and not toward the law of the cases. He insisted that
the issue was one of fact only, i.e. what percentage was permissible for
Commercial to retain. The court distinguished Agran on the grotnd
that there the accountant testified that he had cited cases to the Inter-
nal Revenue agent and had spent four days reading and reviewing over
one hundred cases on "the proposition of law involved."88 In Zelkin
the plaintiff-accountant testified that he had read and cited no law.
Thus the accountant had been practicing law only if on the face of the
problem which he was negotiating, no discussion would have been
possible without reference to legal issues and no persuasive argument
could have been made without reference to legal principles.39
One gets a discomforting sensation in comparing Agran with Zel-
kin, for it appears that the distinguishing feature of the two cases is the
method in which the plaintiff-accountant's case was presented. In
Agran the use of the word "law" was made without thought for the
consequences, whereas counsel for Zelkin sedulously avoided use of
any legal term in presenting his case to the court. The distinction
seems to be more one of semantics than of substance, but if it were not
possible in some way to limit the broad scope of the Agran decision, it
would be virtually impossible for a non-lawyer to practice in the fed-
eral or state income tax field. 40
Agran presented a related holding that is of interest. Agran was
enrolled as an agent to practice before the tax courts. He argued that
38 Id. at 806, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 223 (emphasis the court's).
39 Compare with a similar attempt in Bercu, note 25 supra.
40 Latham, supra note 23.
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his conduct had been in pursuance of his federally granted privilege
to deal with federal tax matters, and that California could not limit
that privilege by interpreting his conduct as unauthorized practice of
law. The court disagreed.
Reduced to its simplest form, plaintiff's argument in effect is this:
By virtue of the Treasury Regulation (C.F.R. 10.2) an enrolled agent
although a non-lawyer is at liberty to perform any and all services
and give advice upon legal questions which constitute the practice of
law within the meaning of that term as generally understood so long
as the work is performed or the advice is given in connection with a
matter involving or arising under the Federal Internal Revenue Code
and pending before the Treasury Department.... If this be true the
same act which would constitute the practice of law under the law of
this State, if performed here, and which if performed by a non-lawyer
not enrolled as an agent by the Treasury Department would subject
him to criminal prosecution, would not constitute the practice of law
if performed by a non-lawyer so enrolled. To accept the plaintifl's
argument would simply mean that the individual states are in effect
deprived of their traditional and long-recognized right to regulate the
practice of law within their borders, at least insofar as such practice
involves matters of so-called "tax law." If this is to be the rule we feel
it should be announced by some higher authority. 41
The "higher authority" has spoken. In Sperry v. Florida ex rel. the
Florida Bar,42 the Supreme Court of the United States held that Flor-
ida could not enjoin a non-lawyer registered to practice before the
United States Patent Office from preparing patent applications and
prosecuting them, notwithstanding that such conduct constituted the
practice of law under state court decisions. According to the opinion,
prior to 1952 all state courts had agreed that the authority to partic-
ipate in administrative proceedings conferred by federal agencies such
as the Patent Office, was either consistent with or pre-emptive of state
law.43 The Court noted that Agran was decided after 1952. Certainly
the Agran denunciation that a federal license is subordinated to state
law must now be scuttled. Dean Griswold had warned 44 that if the bar
became too technical in its insistence that only lawyers be allowed to
practice 'law," the federal government would be forced to take the
position which in fact it did take in Sperry, and put the states in their
41 Agran v. Shapiro, Civil Appeal No. 8891, App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles,
Sept. 20, 1956, as quoted by Latham, The Agran Case Two Years Later, 32 CAL. S. BAR
J. 43, 45-46 (1957) (emphasis added).
42 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
43 Cases are collected id. at 400 nA3.
44 Griswold, A Further Look: Lawyers and Accountants, 41 A.B.A.J. 1113, 1116
(1955).
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place for the sake of federal uniformity.45 Thus, if Agran could con-
vince the court that he was acting within the scope of his Treasury
agency-a fact assumed by the court only to denounce its significance
-the Sperry case would call for a different result today.
The holding of Agran that an accountant cannot indulge in conduct
which the principles and procedures of accounting will not suffice to
handle is still the unquestioned precedent in California. It is disre-
garded every day. The attitude of accountants toward such an inter-
pretation of "practice of law" can well be seen by leafing through any
issue of the Journal of Accountancy, or the Journal of Taxation, and
noting the wealth of advertisements encouraging accountants to buy
"law" books in order to keep up on ever-changing tax 'law." Even a
federal court has taken judicial notice that accountants regularly give
legal advice in their income tax practice.46
That case arose in Louisiana when the clients of a C.P.A. sued his
insurance carrier to recover income tax assessed in connection with
stock sales that the accountant had advised would be tax free. The in-
surance company defended on the ground that the policy covered only
losses due to the C.P.A.'s neglect, error, or omission, and did not include
a loss caused by his erroneous legal advice. The court sidestepped the
issue of unauthorized practice and decided merely that the contract
did cover the particular conduct causing the loss.
Without judging the merits of the accounting professions de facto
rendition of quasi-legal services, we must take judicial notice of the
fact that, in Monroe, Louisiana, as elsewhere, C.P.A.'s regularly ren-
der opinions and advise their clients on matters of federal and state
income tax liability as a routine matter in performance of their pro-
fessional services. As a matter of fact, attorneys-at-law frequently
refer such clients to C.P.A.'s for such advice, which is in a specialized
field; and attorneys also seek such advice directly from C.P.A.'s. In
writing the policy here sued upon, defendant is bound to have known
of this almost universal practice.47
In other words, the client of the C.P.A. is not to be left without a rem-
edy because of the inability of the legal and accounting professions to
define the scope of their respective competence. s
45 The Decision appears to hold that the States have control over the practice
of law within their borders, except to the limited extent necessary for the ac-
complishment of Federal Objectives provided the Federal Objectives are set
forth in a valid Federal Statute and in valid Administrative Regulations.
29 U.P. NEws 182, 183 (1963).
46 Bancroft v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America, 203 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. La. 1962).
47 Id. at 56.
48 Editorial, Tax Advice by C.P.A. Is Not "Unauthorized Practice" Under Mal-
practice Policy, 19 J. TAXATiON 172 (1963).
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The most recent case on the subject is from the courts of New
York, where, for once, the interests of the lawyer and the interests of
the accountant were arrayed on the same side. In Blumenburg v.
Neubecker49 the defendant, Neubecker, came to the plaintiff-attorney
and an accountant, Glickman, and contracted that the two of them
represent him in connection with a tax matter involving a deficiency
of over 900,000 dollars. The contract provided for the plaintiff-lawyer
and his colleague-accountant to be paid one-third of the difference
between the deficiency claimed by the Internal Revenue and the final
sum paid in settlement. The lawyer and the accountant saved Mr.
Neubecker over 600,000 dollars; he refused to pay the fee of 200,000
dollars; the accountant assigned his interest to the plaintiff-lawyer, and
the battle began.
The trial court awarded a judgment for over 200,000 dollars on the
jury verdict. The appellate division reversed on the ground that the
contract violated a New York statute prohibiting attorneys from shar-
ing compensation with non-lawyers, or fee splitting-a misdemeanor.50
The court said there is "good authority" that where a contract is made
jointly by two persons to perform legal services, and one is unlicensed
to practice, no recovery may be had. The contract made no distinction
between the services of the lawyer and those of the accountant-who
was not enrolled before the Treasury Department as was the lawyer-
but rather called for one fee for indivisible services. There was no evi-
dence of the value of the services of either one alone, and the result
must be that if recovery were allowed on the contract, the accountant
and the attorney would share in a fee for legal services. The finding of
the jury that the accountant, Glickman, confined his efforts solely to ac-
counting matters, was not supported by the record as seen by the ap-
pellate division. A vigorous dissent maintained that the record did
support the finding that the services were distinct and that the ac-
countant did not give any legal advice, or check any statutes, or study
any previous decisions.
On further appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the dissent
in the appellate division was expressly adopted, the court holding that
the contract did not, on its face, contemplate any legal service by the
accountant. This decision upholding the contract accords with the
Joint Statement of Principles adopted by the New York State Bar and
the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants. The court
quoted from it with approval:
49 15 App. Div. 2d 952, 226 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1962), re'd, 12 N.Y.2d 456, 240
N.Y.S.2d 730, 191 N.E.2d 269 (1963).
'5 MCKINNEY'S CON. LAws oF N.Y., Book 39, Part 1, Penal Law § 276.
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In the large areas in the tax field where the legal and accounting
aspects are interrelated and overlap, it is often in the public interest
that the services of both professions be utilized. Indeed, experience
has shown that a lawyer and a certified public accountant working
together on behalf of a common client in the tax field constitute a
very effective team. When the lawyer and accountant have joined
hands in the preparation and presentation of a case before the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, the taxpayer is most effectively represented.-"
A decision against the contract in this case would have been a
torpedo to cooperation of the professions on the basis of the Joint
Statement of Principles. The primary significance of Blumenberg is
that it did not sink the effort of cooperation in New York, and so augurs
well for further cooperation between lawyers and accountants in tax
practice.52
The dissenter in the appellate division was opposed to a construc-
tion of the contract that would deny the plaintiff recovery, for the
result would be an unfair and unconscionable advantage to the de-
fendant." This attitude harkens back to the federal court in Louisi-
ana" where the damaged client was not left without a remedy because
the accountant might have "practiced law" in giving him advice. Al-
though this form of reasoning might be labelled as appeasing the
unethical,55 the concern of these courts in avoiding an unconscionable
advantage to one party is laudable, notwithstanding that the result
may not fit neatly into a legally symmetrical definition of the practice
of law. Perhaps the question whether the work of an accountant in
51 McKin-y's CON. LAWS OF N.Y., Book 29, Jud. Law, Appendix (1963 Supp.),
328.
52 See Editorial, 19 J. TAXATiON 115 (1963). The members of the court opposed
to recovery relied in part upon C.F.R. § 10.37(b), 1963 Fed. Tax Regs., vol. 2, p. 1672:
Contingent fees: An enrolled attorney or agent shall not enter into a wholly
contingent fee agreement with a client for representation in any matter before
the Internal Revenue Service unless the client is financially unable to pay a
reasonable fee on any other terms. Partially contingent fee agreements are per-
missible where provision is made for the payment of a minimum, substantially
in relation to the possible maximum fee, which minimum fee is to be paid and
retained irrespective of the outcome of the proceeding.
The majority did not refer to this.
53 Concededly, defendant has received a benefit which was remarkable, un-
usual and eminently satisfactory. There is no basis in the record for any claim
that either in the making of the retainer-contract or in the rendition of services
there was any fraud, bad faith or overreaching on the part of plaintiff or Glick-
man. Under the circumstances, the construction by the majority of this court of
the retainer-contract will result in an unfair and unconscionable advantage to
defendant. Such a result should be avoided wherever possible.... Here, it is
possible.
15 App. Div. 2d at 954, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 456-57.
54 Supra note 46.
55 Supra note 7.
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tax matters is the practice of law cannot be answered by recourse to
the traditional approach to defining unauthorized practice.50
An apparently tailor-made solution would be to foster the develop-
ment of a new profession of lawyer-accountants, and encourage these
people to take over the tax field. 5r However, the so-called dual practi-
tioner is one issue upon which the American Bar Association and the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants have agreed, their
opposition being expressed in a proposed code of conduct.5 Dean
Griswold sees an insurmountable barrier preventing one person from
actively practicing both professions at the same time.59 His reasoning
16 Dean Griswold has said:
It is obvious that the separation of functions between lawyers and qual-
ified accountants in this area is an extremely difficult matter. To me it is rather
clear that there can be no sharp dividing line. You cannot say: "These things
are for accountants, and no lawyer shall ever do that; and these things are for
lawyers, and no accountant shall ever do any of that." The two fields clearly
overlap. But even then it is not like two circles laid one over a part of the
other with common sectors. For as I see it, there are not three clear zones
either. You can't say: "This is for accountants only; this is always for either
accountants or lawyers; and this is for lawyers only." On the contrary, while
the legal field and the accounting field clearly overlap, they shade into one
another, with no clear line between them. In a particular problem, many fac-
tors may come into play, such as, the amount involved, the difficulty or routine-
ness of the question, whether the practitioner, either lawyer or accountant, is
considering the question in the course of his work as regular adviser for the
client, and so on. These are very difficult questions of degree, of more or less.
This makes them hard to grasp and state. But they are not in this respect
unique. They are not different from many other questions arising in human
relationships. A factor which may be quite relevant in a particular case may
well be the degree of training and the professional standing of the person whose
actions are called into question. It may well be appropriate for a certified public
accountant to do things which would be over the line for another with less status.
As quoted by Jennings, 36 U. DET. L.J. 399, 400 (1959).
Compare the remarks of a respected accountant:
Many individuals have made efforts to draw an exact line of demarcation,
the one side representing the province of the legal profession and the other that
of the certified public accountant. After decades of attempts, it is quite ap-
parent that exact line-drawing of this kind leads only to disagreements. In a
case some years ago a jurist in his opinion stated, "the line which divides the
domain of the lawyer from that of the accountant .. . is often shadowy and
wavering ... ... In my experience with attorneys there have been no lines.
Each practitioner has respected the other for his qualifications, thus permitting
and encouraging maximum participation by both.
Queenan, An Inquiry Into the Relationship of Law and Accounting, 36 U. DEr. L.J.
422, 434 (1959).
57 Suggested in Comment 28 So. CAL. L. REv. 303 (1955).
59 Jameson, A Proposed Code of Conduct: The Relationship of Lawyers and Ac-
countants, 44 A.B.A.J. 1049 (1958); also published as A Proposed Code of Conduct for
Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants Who Practice in Association and for Individ-
uals Possessing Dual Qualifications, 36 U. DET. L.J. 440 (1959).
59 Griswold, supra note 44, at 1115.
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is that the accounting side of dual practice would serve as a feeder for
the law practice, and would violate Canon 27 of the Canons of Ethics.60
Furthermore, Griswold sees an irreconcilable gulf separating the nature
of the accountant's work from the lawyer's, in that the accountant as
an auditor is an independent examiner whereas the lawyer as an advo-
cate is to give his all for the client.
The argument in opposition to the proposed code is that the dual-
practitioner would provide a valuable service at a lower cost to the
client than that for two professional men. It is also argued that there
is no more of a "feeder" problem with the dual practitioner than there
is with an attorney licensed to sell real estate or insurance. The code
does not recognize that much of what an attorney does "feeds" his
practice without violating Canon 27. And the argument that the audi-
tor-advocate role places the dual practitioner in a "schizophrenic posi-
tion" is probably more theoretical than practical, because the vast
majority of auditing today is done by national accounting corporations,
and not individuals. In light of these considerations, the conclusion
of one writer is that the primary reason for the opposition of the Na-
tional Conference to the dual practitioner scheme is that there are
only about 450 dual practitioners, and this one point of agreement
would step on a relatively small number of toes.0 1
Despite the objections, it seems that the dual practitioner will be-
come more of a factor in the solution to the income tax problem of
lawyers and accountants. Even if the bar opposes dual practice, it
favors lawyers learning about accounting and accountants learning
60 The Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association, Canon 27:
Advertising, Direct or Indirect. It is unprofessional to solicit professional
employment by circulars, advertisements, through touters or by personal com-
munciations or interviews not warranted by personal relations. . . . It is not
improper for a lawyer who is admitted to practice as a proctor in admiralty
to use that designation on his letterhead or shingle or for a lawyer who has com-
plied with the statutory requirements of admission to practice before the patent
office, to so use the designation "patent attorney" or "patent lawyer" or "trade-
mark attorney" or "trademark lawyer" or any combination of those terms.
Opinion 272 (Oct. 25, 1946) of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Griev-
ances of the American Bar Association:
The Committee all agree that a lawyer, who is also a C.P.A. may perform
what are primarily accounting services, as an incident to his law practice, with-
out violating our Canons. We are also agreed that he may not properly hold
himself out as practicing accounting at the same office as that in which he
practices law, since this would constitute an advertisement of his services as
accountant which would violate Canon 27 as construed in our opinions.
33 A.B.A.J. 162, 163 (1947). See 63 HAiv. L. REv. 1457 (1950) where a conflicting
opinion of the New York County Lawyers Ass'n is noted and the problem is discussed.
61 Wilson, The Attorney-C.P.A. and the Dual Practice Problem, 36 U. DET. L.J.
457 (1959).
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about law.2 This encouragement of the professions to overlap will
inevitably lead to development of a sub rosa dual practitioner at least.
Continued participation of accountants in federal income tax law
was assured by the Supreme Court in Sperry.63 Although the Court
did not say how far a federal agency could permit a non-lawyer to en-
croach upon the territory of the lawyer, it did say that enrollment
before a federal administrative tribunal would protect the agent from
prosecution for those activities necessary to the agency. The Sperry
decision would apply to both of the California cases referred to. The
argument by Agran that his enrollment immunized him from a state
finding of unauthorized practice would be given more weight; and
Zelkin would have an argument to add to his semantic exercise. Both
accountants might successfully argue that their enrollment before the
Treasury Department included the privilege to negotiate with revenue
agents outside the Tax Courts as well as to practice before the tri-
bunals themselves. However, it remains that the individual states
have absolute control over what the "practice of law" shall be respect-
ing non-lawyers who appear before state tax and other administrative
tribunals.6 4
Perhaps the ultimate solution was set forth admirably many years
ago by the editor of the Journal of Accountancy. As to the improper
preparation of federal tax returns and other tax work "does not the
proper remedy lie with the United States Treasury Department, which
already regulates other branches of federal tax practice, is directly
interested, and is familiar with all phases of the problem? Would not
the appropriate procedure be for strong representations to be made
to the Treasury Department by organizations of the responsible prac-
titioners, both lawyers and accountants, in the tax field? It seems to
us that such procedure would be infinitely better from all points of
view than for local bar associations to institute scattered proceedings
which, if successful, would eliminate the qualified, as well as the un-
qualified, from tax practice, and perhaps lay the bar open to the charge
of attempting to regulate tax practice in its own interest through the
use of its extraordinary status in state courts, which are not familiar
with all the practical facets of the problem."65
62 Jameson, supra note 58, at 1049.
63 373 U.S. 379 (1963), supra note 42.
64 Bennett, Non-Lawyers and the Practice of Law Before State and Federal Agen-
cies, 46 A.B.A.J. 705 (1960).
65 Editorial, Another Bar Association Suit Against Nonlawyers in Tax Practice, 90
J. AccouNTANcy 187 (1950).
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